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U.S.-NIGERIA RELATIONS IN
IDSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Elizabeth L. Normandy , The University of North Carolina at
Pembroke
Introduction
United States' relations with Nigeria have alternated between
periods of close or special relations and periods of indifference, neglect,
and hostility. Major developments in the relationship include a period of
cordial relations from 1960 to 1966, strained relations from the first
Nigerian coup through the civil war 1966-1970, and a growing
rapprochement from 1970 to 1979 due to mutual economic interests and
the election of Jimmy Carter . The policies of the Reagan administration
caused strains in the relationship. The Nigerian civil war and Angolan
independence were events which led to low points in the relationship . In
the post-Cold War period, U.S.-Nigeria relations have reached a new low
point due to the changed priorities of U.S . foreign policy, the continuing
turmoil in Nigeria's political system, and the deteriorating state of
Nigeria's economy. Because U.S. policy towards Nigeria is an outgrowth
of U.S. policy on Africa in general and because Nigeria's actions towards
the U .S. are related to Nigeria's overall foreign policy goals, the
discussi on ofU. S.-Nigeria relations in each of the time periods considered
is preceded by a brieflook at the predominant features ofNigerian foreign
policy and U.S. Africa policy.

The "Era of Good Feeling," 1960-1966
At independence, it was assumed that Nigeria, because ifits size,
resources, and location, would play an important role in African politics
and world affairs . Nigeria ' s leaders espoused a commitment to
nonintervention in the internal affairs of other African countries, a
preference for a gradual, functional approach to African unity based on
economic co-operation, and an emphasis on gradual and non-violent
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progress towards African independence . 1 However, the centerpiece of
Nigeria ' s foreign policy was
the commitment to a policy of
nonalignment. At the same time, Nigeria would continue to have close
economic and other ties to the West, owing to the need for capital and
trained manpower to support Nigeria ' s economic development. 2 Trade
with other African countries was insignificant and ties to the Communist
countries were practically nonexistent. 3 In African affairs , Nigeria
played a moderate role, supporting UN efforts in the Congo crisis and
taking a leadership role in the formation of the Organization of African
Unity.4
U.S. policy on Africa under the Eisenhower administration
combined rhetorical support for African independence with the
subordination of decolonization to the needs of anti-Communism .s As
the colonial powers signaled their intention to grant independence in the
late 1950s, the U.S. modified its policy to reflect a more pro-Africa
stance, but it did not become actively involved 'in events in Africa . In
1957, Vice President Richard Nixon represented the U.S. at Ghana ' s
independence celebration and, in 1958; the Department of State created
a separate Bureau of African Affairs. Although strong ties to the West
would be encouraged , the U.S. would continue to subordinate its policy
to European concerns. 6
Under Kennedy , the U.S. emphasized integrating newlyindependent and nonaligned African states into the non-Communist
world largely through the use of economic aid. Additionally , the U.S.
supported African aspirations regarding sovereignty and an independent
foreign policy and did not eng!lge in coercive diplomacy.7 With the
exception of the Congo, where the U.S. worked to prevent Soviet
involvement, there seemed to be no area of Africa under serious threat of
Communist infiltration. There were very few specific African issues of
interest to the U.S., and it was content to allow the European powers take
the lead in most areas of the continent. 8
U.S.-Nigeria relations in the period from independence to the
first military coup were exceptionally friendly. 9 Nigeria ' s attractiveness
to the U.S. was based on its size, particularly its large population , which
indicated that Nigeria was destined to play a leadership role in Africa .
Nigeria, on the other hand , recognized the importance of the U.S. to
Nigeria's political and economic development. Soon after independence ,
Nigeria was admitted to the U.N., and Nigeria chose the U.S. to perform
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the symbolically significant role of recommending its membership to the
General Assembly. Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, Nigeria's first prime
minister, met with Kennedy during an official visit to the U.S. in July
1961 and addressed a joint session of Congress.
In the Congo crisis of the 1960s, the interests ofNigeria and the
U.S. coincided. Both countries supported United Nations efforts to
preserve peace, stability, and unity in the Congo. The U.S. and Nigeria
also sought to develop strong economic ties during this early period. The
U.S. wished to expand trade and encourage investment. Nigeria was
hoping to benefit from American economic and technical aid programs .
In the American view, Nigeria was to be the model for other
African countries to follow. Reinforced by the nature of its foreign aid,
Nigeria's essentially cautious and conservative foreign policy continued
to favor the West. When ethnic conflict erupted, the U.S. hoped that
economic development would be the antidote to Nigeria's political
instability and would keep Nigeria from succumbing to radical and
Communist influences.

The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970
Since independence, the major problem which had plagued
Nigeria's leaders had been to maintain Nigeria ' s unity in the face of the
disintegrative forces set in motion by Nigeria's multi-ethnic composition.
In early 1966, a group of army majors engineered a military take-over
which brought Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi to power. Following the July
1966 counter-coup, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowan assumed the
leadership of the military government. The Governor of the Eastern
Region, Lieutenant Colonel Odemegwu Ojukwu, refused to recognize
Gowon's authority and declared Biafra an independent state on May 30,
1967.10
Nigeria's primary goal was to limit the international assistance
Biafra received. It tried to convince African governments that it could
end the secession quickly and to show the West that it was capable of
deliberation and restraint. The OAU supported Nigerian reunification,
and Nigeria used this and the support of other members of the
international community to prevent further recognition or backing of
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Biafra. Biafra campaigned to involve the world in what was portrayed as
a struggle against genocide . The goal was to mobilize international
pressure to get Nigeria to accept an unconditional cease-fire . Although
four African governments recognized Biafra, Biafra did not succeed in
provoking greater international recognition or in persuading Nigeria to
agree to a cease-fire. Recognition by other African governments was not
forthcoming . When Biafra became the focus of an international relief
operation, it was able to prolong the war. Although Biafra tried to make
its viability and self-reliance the centerpiece of its foreign policy, it was
defeated militarily and was forced to surrender on January 15, 1970.11
Lyndon Johnson did not have John Kennedy ' s interest in Africa.
His policies did not differ markedly from those of his predecessors and
African issues did not have a high priority as the administration's time
and attention were taken up more crucial issues such as Vietnam. Aid to
Africa was scaled back .12
American optimism over Nigeria ' s future as a unified country
playing a leadership role in Africa was shattered by the January 1966
coup. The U.S. hoped the military government could keep Nigeria united.
Although Nigeria wanted to buy arms from the U.S., the U.S. declared an
arms embargo on both sides on July 10th, 1967. Nigeria accused the U.S.
of supporting Biafra . The relationship between the two co~tries was
strained. The U.S. later modified its neutral policy somewhat by
authorizing funds for relief, but the U.S. role in the relief effort further
strained its relationship with Nigeria. 13
The election of Richard Nixon in November 1968 buoyed the
hopes of the Biafrans that a change of U.S. policy might occur. Although
policy makers explored the option of recognizing Biafra, Nixon and
Kissinger decided to expand the relief program instead. The Nigerians
were concerned that any shift in U.S. policy would involve the U.S. in
political questions. The Biafrans were hoping that Nixon would support
a cease-fire. The Nigerians were relieved, therefore, when Nixon
announced that there would be no majornew U.S. involvement. After the
surrender, President Nixon offered Gowon an additional $10 million for
relief . 14
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Rapprochement and Confrontation, 1970-1976
One of Nigeria's first initiatives in the aftennath of the civil war
was to take steps to develop ECOWAS, the Economic Community of
West African States. Nigeria also sought to play a greater role in African
affairs. It reconciled with the four states that recognized Biafra and tried
to have a greater role in the OAU. 15
In the years following the civil war, Nigeria became more
strongly committed to eliminating colonialism and racism. Nigeria
advocated an increase in member contributions to the OAU liberation
committee and provided direct bilateral assistance to freedom fighters . In
relations with countries outside Africa, Nigeria played a prominent role
in negotiations with the EEC, clashed with the British government over
its policies towards white-minority ruled regimes in Southern Africa, and
improved its relations with France. In an effort to strengthen its
nonalign ed status, Nigeria sought to maintain and expand ties with the
Soviet Union and to increase economic ties with other Communist
countries. 16
During the 1970-1976 period, Nigeria's ability to exert influence
in African affairs was strengthened by its oil boom. As a result of this
development, Nigeria's trading patterns shifted somewhat. While Britain
remained Nigeria's major trading partner, the U.S. became a major
foreign market for oil and Nigeria's main source of foreign exchange. 17
In July 1975, a coup in Nigeria ended the regime of Yakubu
Gowon and brought to power Brigadier General Murtala Muhammed.
The style of Nigeria's foreign policy became more militant, radical, and
nationalistic. More emphasis was placed on the struggle against
colonialism, racism, and apartheid, and relations with neighbors were
initially downplayed. This approach led Nigeria into intense conflict
with the U.S. over Angola . In power only a few months, Muhammed
was assassinated in an abortive coup attempt, and Lieutenant General
Olusegun Obasanjo took over as head of the Nigerian government.
Initially, the Obasanjo government retained the same radical and dynamic
style and continued to confront the U.S. on Southern African issues. 18
Initially, the Nixon administration viewed Africa as a minor area
of interest. The Nixon Qoctrine, based on the need for a certain amount
of U.S . retrenchment, called for Africa to be an area in which the U.S.
would not have to intervene. The U .S. adopted Option 2 of National
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Security Study Memorandum 39 which called for greater communication
with South Africa in order to bring about a liberalization of its racial
policies. The U.S. showed little interest in other areas, expending few
resources, showing indifference towards Rhodesian sanctions , and
supporting arms sales to Portugal. Following the Portuguese coup of
1974 and the impending take-over of the Angolan government by the
Marxist MPLA, the U .S. decided to support opposition forces . However ,
the U .S. Congress cut off further military aid for Angola in December
1975, forcing the administration to look for other means oflimiting Soviet
influence in Africa. In July 1976, Henry Kissinger announced a change
in U.S. policy in which the U.S . would support majority rule in Southern
Africa, promote Namibian independence , and involve South Africa in
negotiations over Namibia and Rhodesia. 19
Until the Portuguese coup , U.S.-Nigeria relations were
characterized by increasing economic interaction but considerable
political indifference . Oil became the major focus of the relationship . As
U.S. dependence on Nigerian oil increased , Nigeria considered whether
or not to use its newfound wealth and power to try to bring about changes
in U .S. policy on Southern Africa. Through 1973, the U.S. did its best
not to deal with Nigeria on political questions , especiall y those
concerning Southern Africa .20
Following the Portuguese coup and the U.S. decision to back
anti-MPLA forces in Angola in 1975, relations between Nigeria and the
U.S. reached a low point. Nigerian troops forcibly occupied the USIS
office in Lagos . In October 1975, Nigeria backed the MPLA with $20
million in aid and lobbied other African states to recognize the MPLA
government. 2 1 Nigeria viewed U.S. policy on Angola as racist and neocolonial and charged the U .S. with collaboration with South Africa on the
Angolan issue . The situation · did not improve when , in January 1976,
Gerald Ford sent a message to African heads of state at a meeting of the
OAU offering to have South African troops removed from Angola in
exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Nigeria quickly
condemned the letter and attacked the U.S. at the OAU summit.
Although the U.S. tried to repair relations with Nigeria , the
situation was still one of hostility when Olusegun Obasanjo took over as
head of the Nigerian government. Three requests by Henry Kissinger to
visit Nigeria were refused. In October 1976, Nigeria rejected British and
American proposals for Rhodesia . Despite its hard line stance , Nigeria
42
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had not been able to affect the course of U.S. policy. 22

Obasanjo and Carter, 1976-1980
Under Obasanjo's leadership, regional cooperation was restored
to a high priority in Nigerian foreign policy . While Nigeria's support for
freedom fighters in Southern Africa remained strong, it moved towards
occupying the role of peacekeeper or mediator in African conflicts.
Relations with Britain were put on a more positive footing, with Nigeria
endorsing the Anglo-American peace plan for Rhodesia. Economic ties
with the West remained strong . In 1978, the U .S. bought 60% of
Nigeria's oil and provided Nigeria with 54% of its financial resources .
Nigeria continued to receive technical assistance from the West, and
economic relationships with Communist countries did not expand . As
Nigeria prepared for elections in 1979 to return the country to civilian
rule, it appeared that a major constraint on the further development of
Nigeria ' s foreign policy was the need to concentrate on domestic
problems. Shehu Shargari was elected president of Nigeria's Second
Republic in October 1979.23
President Carter took more of an interest in African than any
president since John F. Kennedy . The U.S . commited itself to support
for majority rule, to the promotion of human rights, and to contributing to
economic development in order to achieve its goals in Africa. It did not
cast African issues in a Cold War context . While the U.S . criticized
South Africa and distanced itself from South Africa, it did not enact
sanctions against it because the U .S. needed South Africa's help to solve
the crises in Rhodesia and Namibia.i 4 •
Early in the administration, officials tried to distance the U.S.
from the Mobutu regime in Zaire and declined to involve the U.S.
militarily in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. The U.S. rejected
an internal settlement negotiated by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith
which would not have resulted in genuine majority rule and participated
in the development of an Anglo-American peace plan. On Namibia, the
U.S. worked with a group of nations known as the Western Contact
Group to bring about a peaceful solution. 25
In the latter part of the Carter adm·inistration, U.S. policy on
Africa changed to one that more closely resembled that of previous
Volume 25, 1997 \
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administrations, emphasizing containment of Soviet expansion through
military means. The shift was brought about by a series of events
including the seizure of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, and by the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola
and Ethiopia. A second invasion of Zaire in mid-1978 brought a forceful
response from the U.S. in support of the Mobutu regime. Relations with
South Africa were marked more by cooperation than pressure. The U.S.
concluded an agreement with Somalia for the use of military facilities in
exchange for economic and security assistance . In general, African issues
lost the primacy that they had in the early years of the Carter
administration. 26
In the changed atmosphere of U.S. policy towards Africa in the
first part of the Carter administration, U.S .-Nigeria relations flourished.
The U.S. viewed Nigeria as a key player in its Africa policy. On a visit
to Nigeria in February 1977, Andrew Young established close ties with
Nigeria's leaders. Nigeria decided to back the Anglo-American plan for
peace in Rhodesia in September 1977.27 In October 1977, Obasanjo
visited the U.S., the first Nigerian head of state to meet with a U.S.
president since Balewa met with Kennedy in 1961. Following a visit to
Nigeria in 1978, Carter continued to reject an internal settlement in
Rhodesia, and Obasanjo tried to try to get African countries to support the
Anglo-American plan.28
Upon the return of a Cold War orientation in U .S. policy,
relations between the U.S. and Nigeria cooled. Nigeria was .frustrated
ove.rthe inability of the U.S. to produce concrete results in the movement
towards majority rule in Southern Africa . After 1978, Nigeria
concentrated on the impending return to civilian rule. Economic ties
remained strong. Bilateral talks about agricultural, education , economic
development, and technical assistance resulted in a cooperative
agreement on agriculture. The U.S. became a major supplier of food to
Nigeria in the late l 970s. Nigeria continued to reap tremendous profits
from the rising price ofoil until 1981, and U.S. dependence on Nigerian
oil increased. Despite its wealth from oil, Nigeria found it necessary to
resort to extensive foreign borrowing in order to finance its development
plans. 29

44

I The Journal of Political Science

US-Nigeria

The Reagan Years, 1981-1988
During the regime of Shehu Shagari, Nigeria faced a
deteriorating economic and political situation. The oil boom ended in
198l as oil prices began to drop. Government spending, foreign debt, and
corruption increased. Although the government instituted austerity
measures, it decided not to accept loans from the IMF for fear of the
political consequences of IMF conditions. On the political scene, the
government had to contend with disturbances among the Muslim
population in the North, student protests, and a teachers' strike.30
Nigeria's ability to play a leadership role in Africa declined
under the weight of its economic and political problems. Shagari' s policy
was considerably more ambiguous and uncertain than Obasanjo' s, and his
style was more cautious. The goals of Nigeria's foreign policy, as stated
in the 1979 constitution, were the promotion of African unity, liberation
of Africa, and elimination of racial discrimination. Border clashes with
Benin, Chad, and Cameroon were resolved through negotiation. A
Nigeria-led multinational African force in Chad failed to secure Libyan
withdrawal, demonstrating Nigeria's weakness and undermining the
Shagari government. In a crackdown on illegal immigration motivated by
deteriorating domestic conditions, Nigeria expelled more than two million
foreign workers .31
Corruption and economic chaos led the military to take over
once again in December 1983. The regime of Major General Muhammad
Buhari tried to reduce corruption and restore the economy. A series of
austerity measures were adopted, but negotiation with the IMF for new
loans failed. The regime dealt harshly with criticism, jailing journalists,
politicians, and other dissenters. Foreign policy activity was minimal. In
1984, Nigeria closed all of its borders for a time in order to control
currency trafficking and smuggling, and there was another mass
deportation of illegal aliens in 1985:32
In August 1985, Buhari was deposed in a bloodless coup and
was replaced by Major General Ibrahim Babangida. The new regime
committed itself to the return of civilian rule and began to release
journalists, dissidents, and political prisoners. In dealing with Nigeria's
pressing economic problems, Babangida rejected the option of an IMF
loan, and formulated his own austerity program. 33
Nigeria's ability to exercise influence internationally was
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hampered by the weakness of its economy and its political instability .
Although relations with African states continued to be the cornerstone of
foreign policy, economic diplomacy involving trade, foreign investment,
and debt rescheduling had a high priority on the agenda. 34 Outside of the
region, Nigeria contributed $20 million to assist SWAPO in the 1989
elections in Namibia and provided forces to the UN operations to monitor
the Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the Angola-Namibia Accords .. Relations with
France improved due to expanding economic ties and common opposition
to Libya's involvement in Chad. Despite the British government's
opposition to sanctions against South Africa, relations between Nigeria
and Britain improved .35
Under Reagan, U.S . foreign policy returned to a Cold War
orientation emphasizing containment of the Soviet Union. In this
environment, Africa was not important to the U.S .. The major focus of
U.S. Africa policy was Southern Africa where pressure on South Africa
was considered counter-productive. The .U.S. hoped that the policy
known as "constructive engagement" would bring not only internal reform
in South Africa but secure its help in resolving regional problems. U.S.
goals included securing independence for Namibia, the withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola, and the removal of the Marxist government
in Angola . To obtain the latter, the U.S. supported Jonas Savimbi and the
rival UNIT A faction in Angola. The U.S . vetoed UN resolutions calling
for sanctions against South Africa. South African incursions into Angola
and guerrilla attacks in Mozambique were met with only mild criticism .
Nonetheless, U.S. negotiators failed to achieve a comprehensive
settlement of Southern African problems by the end of Reagan's firstterm
in 1984.
Elsewhere in Africa, Cold War considerations prevailed . The
U.S. supported the Mobutu regime in Zaire because of its value as an antiCommunist ally. Fears of Soviet gains in the Horn of Africa prompted
offers of military aid to Somalia. In Reagan's second term, Chester
Crocker achieved agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa on
Namibia. Despite a presidential veto, the U.S. Congress imposed
sanctions on South Africa. Congress also repealed the Clark Amendment
which banned assistance to Angolan guerrillas, and covert aid began to
flow to Jonas Savimbi's forces. 36
Nigeria's relations with the U.S . did not flourish in this Cold
War environment. The U.S . did not consider relations with Nigeria to be
46
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a high priority, and Nigeria, beset by economic and political problems,
had little ability to command U.S . attention. The U.S. saw no role for
Nigeria in Southern Africa . Although Nigeria was highly critical of U.S .
policy there, its efforts to get the U.S. to change its position were
unsuccess ful. In 1982, Nigeria refused to support the removal of all
foreign troops from Southern Africa and called on the U.S. to implement
sanctions against South Africa. Nigeria opposed dialogue with South
Africa and the loosening of the arms embargo . Nigeria was unable to
change the U.S. position on Namibia or to prevent its support of
UNITA. 37
In economic matters, Nigeria's importance to the U.S. also
declined . Nigeria's need for loans and debt rescheduling increased its
dependence on the U.S. Nigerians suspected that the U .S. was
responsib le for the stringent conditions attached to potential IMF loans .38

The Post-Cold War Period
Elections to return Nigeria to civilian rule took place in June
1993, but were later annulled by the Babangida regime . In November
1993, General Sani Abacha seized power . One of a series of summary
trials in the fall of 1995 led to the conviction and subsequent execution of
nine Ogoni minority rights activists, including author Ken Saro-Wiwa .39
The government announced a three-year timetable to complete the
transiti on to civilian rule. However, human rights abuses, including
arbitrary detention, restrictions on freedom of expression and association,
and the use of military tribunals continue unabated. In 1997, Nobel Prize
winne r, Wole Soyinka , and more than a dozen leaders of the National
Democratic Coalition ofNigeria (NADECO) were charged with treason .
Nigeria's economic picture has not improved . Through 1992 the
budget deficit increased , and external debt continued to grow until 1993.
Although Abacha initially abandoned Babangida's economic reform
program and emphasized state control, in 1995, he announced a series of
reforms designed to attract investors and facilitate debt rescheduling .
With a GNP per capita ofless than $300, Nigeria is considered one of the
world's poores t countries. 40
Despite its political an'd economic problems, Nigeria continues
to be a force in the region . Beginning in 1990, Nigeria contributed the
Volume 25, 1997 \
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bulk of the forces to the ECOW AS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) in Liberia. Nigeria also sent troops to Sierra Leone to try to
restore the democratically-elected government. Other regional issues
involve long-standing border disputes with Cameroon over the Bakassi
Islands and with Chad over islands in Lake Chad . Outside of the region,
Nigeria contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda ,
Yugoslavia , and Somalia. 41
In the wake of the 1993 election annulment , relations with
Western powers have been strained . However, no industrialized country
has been willing to embargo Nigerian oil in order to force changes in
Nigeria's political system. Despite the emergence of South Africa as the
next probable African leader and role model, Nigeria still aspires to
exercise a leadership role in Africa and in the world as evidenced in its
continuing quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 42
U.S. policy on Africa in the post-Cold War era has reflected a
concern for promoting democracy and human rights, for encouraging
economic reform in African countries , and for the resolution of conflicts .
When the Soviets withdrew from Africa at the end of the Cold War, U.S.
strategic interests in Africa receded , and U.S. assistance decreased.
Observers pondered such questions as whether or not the U.S. would now
decrease its support for dictatorial regimes and whether or not U.S. aid
should be used to press for political and economic reform. 43
The Bush administration came into office pledging to follow
Reagan ' s policies. It condemned the statist model of economic policy
.followed by African countries and reaffirmed U.S. support for free market
economics . It insisted that it would promote peaceful change in southern
Africa but would not support further sanctions against South Africa or
withdraw support from Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. By 1992, the Bush
administration could claim to have participated in conflict resolution in
Angola, Namibia , Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Liberia. Thirty million
dollars had been allocated for electoral assistance and to promote civil
and political rights : More than one billion dollars in official debt to the
U.S. had been forgiven for the poorest African countries committed to
economic reform. On the basis of South Africa's progress in dismantling
apartheid , the U.S. repealed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. As
the Bush administration prepared to leave office, U.S. troops were sent to
Somalia on a humanitarian mission. 44
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As the Bush administration had done, the Clinton administration
took office condemning the statist policies of African governments ,
corruption, and one-party rule. It pledged that U.S. aid would be used to
assist democracies and free market economies and not dictatorial regimes.
In 1993, the U.S. recognized Angola . Sam Nujoma ofNamibia was the
first African head of state to visit the Clinton White House. Recognition
was extended to Eritrea following elections in 1993. $1 billion was
contribute d to drought relief in Southern Africa .45
American troops were withdrawn from Somalia in 1994
following the deaths of U.S. soldiers, and, in the wake of the Somali
debacle, U.S. involvement in the Rwanda crisis was limited. Although the
U.S. encouraged Mobutu of Zaire to negotiate with the opposition , it did
not call upon him to step down, nor did it take stronger measures against
his regime. The U.S. continued its support of the ECOWAS effort in
Liberia. 46
In response to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni
activists in 1995, the U.S. instituted modest sanctions against Nigeria . It
halted direct air travel from the U.S. to Nigeria, suspended foreign aid,
and banned the sale of military equipment. U.S. support for World Bank
and IMF assistance was withdrawn, and Nigerian officials were banned
from traveling to the U.S. 47 In 1997, the U.S. undertook a comprehensive
review ofits policy towards Nigeria , but the options for changing the U.S .
position are limited. There is no support for an oil embargo, and any
attempt to improve cooperation seems likely to draw opposition from
human rights groups, members of Congress, and Trans-Africa, the
African-American pressure group .48 In 1997, members of Congress
introduced a resolution condemning Nigeria ' s behavior towards the U.S.
Ambassador and proposed legislation to implement strong economic
sanctions against Nigeria. A movement among local government in the
U.S. to pass pro-democracy resolutions and impose sanctions against
Nigeria grew. In September 1997, Alameda County, California passed a
binding selective purchase/divestment resolution which, it is estimated,
will cost corporations doing business in or with Nigeria $200 million.49
Nigeria has lobbied for a reversal of U.S. policy. Its efforts to
blame U.S. Ambassador Walter Carrington for the hostile American
attitude were apparently a factor in his recall in August 1997. A farewell
party for Carrington organized by human rights and pro-democracy
groups was disrupted by Nigerian police causing the U.S . to lodge an
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official protest with the Nigerian government. Despite the troubled
diplomatic relationship, economic ties have flourished . The U.S. is still
the largest buyer of Nigerian oil, accounting for 40% of Nigeria ' s oil
sales . In September 1997, Nigeria began exporting liquefied petroleum
gas to the U.S. According to William H. Twaddell , the U.S. ambassadordesignee, Nigeria is America's most significant trade and investment
partner in Africa . The imposition of tough economic sanctions are seen
as damaging to U.S. interests in Nigeria .50

Conclusion
The relationship between the U.S. and Nigeria in the post-Cold
war period differs in some significant ways from that which preceded it.
The alternations that can be seen in U.S.-Nigeria relations during the Cold
War can be ascribed to two equally i.mportapt factors. First, U.S.Nigerian relations were obviously affected by the degree to which U.S.
policy on Africa operated from a Cold War framework. Relations
between the two countries improved when Cold War issues were not the
primary focus ofU.S. policy on Africa , and they deteriorated when issues
of concern to Nigeria were subordinated to the U.S. preoccupation with
Soviet designs . This explains the relatively good relations during the
Kennedy and Carter years. It is also the reason the U.S.-Nigeria relations
reached such a low point over the issue of Angola during the Nixon
administration .
Second, U.S.-Nigerian relations were affected by Nigeria's
domestic economic and political situation . Political instability diverted
Nigeria ' s attention away from foreign policy,jeopardized Nigeria ' s claim
to leadership status, and caused the U.S. to distance itself from Nigeria.
When Nigeria ' s leaders were preoccupied with holding the country
together during the civil war, or trying to manage a transition from
military to civilian rule, or trying to combat corruption , or preoccupied
with silencing government critics during ti.mes of rapid regime change,
their attention to foreign affairs was often diminished . Nigeria's
economy, on the other hand, was ll source of strength in the relationship .
The economic ties between the U.S. and Nigeria seemed to endure and
flourish whatever the nature of their political relationship . This explains
why the highest point in the relationship occurred in the late 1970s when,
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because of oil, the U .S. looked upon Nigeria as an African power . Also
at that time, Cold War considerations were temporarily on the back
burner. The deterioration of the economy in the Reagan years, coinciding
with the return to a Cold War approach to Africa, contributed to the poor
state of the relationship during the 1980s.
In the post-Cold War period , U.S .-Nigeria relations have reached
a new low since the advent of the Abacha regime . The end of the Cold
War was a mixed blessing for Nigeria . No longer do Cold War
considerations dominate the relationship with the U.S., but, in the postCold War environment, U.S. interest in Africa has diminished and
concern for democratization and economic reform has replaced Cold War
issues . Now more than ever, factors internal to Nigeria seem to be the
determin ants of the relationship with the U.S. America's renewed interest
in Nige ria as a partner in trade and investment, the abiding U.S. interest
in oil, and the emphasis in U.S. policy on economic reform in African
countr ies all combine to make Nigeria ' s economic situation an important
factor in the relationship. American emphasis on democratization comes
at a time when Nigeria ' s progress towards democracy is just about as slow
as it has ever been . U.S.-Nigeria relations do not seem likely to improve
in the near future unless the downward spiral of Nigeria ' s economy and
political system is reversed . If U.S .-Nigeria relations do not improve
soon, it may no longer be possible to characterize the relationship as
altern ating between highs and lows, but rather as being in a state of
permanent decline .
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